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Issue 1

COURTREPORTS

claimants have the burden to prove the requested amendments by a preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, the Court rejected Nelson's argument
and held that the Brooks' motion to amend did not serve as a repudiation of
the original claim.
The Court then addressed whether the water court erred by relying on the
Brooks' Statement of Claim as prima facie evidence of the water right. The
Court noted that a claim of an existing light "constitutes prima facie proof of its
contents until the issuance of a final decree, and that an objector has the burden
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the elements of the original
claim do not reflect the actual beneficial use of the water, as it existed prior to
July 1, 1973." Nelson's argument relied on the inference that since the mine
was in operation until 1976, Minerals Engineering was likely using the Disputed
Well until that time. The Court dismissed this argument and held that the water
court correctly concluded that such inferences are not sufficient to overcome
the prima facie proof of a filed Statement of Claim.
The Court next addressed whether the water court erred by concluding that
it did not need to consider whether the Brooks' claimed right was a "use" night
or a "filed" ight. A "use right" is a right that puts water to a beneficial use
without written notice, filing, or decree, whereas a "filed right" is a right filed
and recorded prior to July 1, 1973. The Court then upheld the water court's
determination that it need not consider what type of right was in question because, in this case, the type of right was immaterial because both types require
proof of beneficial use, and because the amount of use, priority date, and purpose of use are not related to the type of right
Finally, the Court addressed whether the water court erred by concluding
that ownership of the land containing the point of diversion for the claim was
not dispositive of the ownership of the water right. Nelson claimed that the
water court incorrectly disregarded evidence as to Apex's ownership of the mining claim where the Disputed Well was located. The Court held that a water
right is a "usufructuary" right, rather than a physical ownership right, and therefore, "ownership of land where water has its source does not necessarily give
exclusive right to such waters so as to prevent others from acquiring rights
therein." Therefore, Nelson's claim of ownership of the mining claim where
the Disputed Well was located was not dispositive of the issue of ownership of
the Disputed Well's water.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the water court's determination that the
claim belonged to the Brooks, and that Nelson failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Brooks' use of the Disputed Well did not accurately reflect the use as it existed prior to 1973.
Devon Bell
Pub. Lands Access Ass'n v. Bd. of Cnty Comm's ofMadison Cnty., 321
P.3d 38 (Mont. 2014) (holding that (i) a public road right-of-way includes the
land reasonably necessary for maintenance, repair, and enjoyment; (ii) remand
was necessary to determine the width of the public right-of-way established by
prescriptive use; (iii) public use of the road right-of-way to access the Ruby River
for recreational purposes was permissible; and (iv) access to the river through
the public road right-of-way did not constitute an unconstitutional taking of the

WATER LA W REVIEW

Volume 18

landowner's property).
In Madison County, Montana ("County"), Seyler Lane, Lewis Lane, and
the Duncan District Road cross the Ruby River by way of bridges. The County
built and maintains the three bridges, and all three roads are public. The public
acquired use of Lewis Lane and the Duncan District Road through deed and
statutory petition, respectively. The public acquired a right-of-way to Seyler
Lane and Seyler Bridge through prescriptive use. Defendant James C. Kennedy ("Kennedy") owns land that abuts Seyler Lane and Seyler Bridge. In 2004,
with the County's permission, Kennedy built a private fence along the public
right-of-way.
In 2004 the Public Lands Access Association, Inc. ("PLAA") sued the
County, asserting that the fence intruded on the public's right-of-way and prevented the public from accessing the river. The trial court determined that the
Seyler Lane public right-of-way, acquired by prescriptive use, included only the
paved and traveled portion of the road and did not includ& the land beyond
Kennedy's fences. The trial court granted the County a separate secondary
prescriptive ight for any use reasonable and necessary for maintenance and
repair. PLAA appealed the decision.
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court ("Court") determined that all four
issues PLAA raised boiled down to one question: whether the public had a right
to use the Seyler Lane right-of-way to access the Ruby River. To answer this
inquiry, the Court had to determine (i) the ultimate width of the Seyler Lane
right-of-way established by prescriptive use and (ii) the purpose for which the
right-of-way may be used.
In deciding to grant the County a secondary easement, the trial court relied
on Montana case law stating that secondary easement rights may be granted to
owners of canal or ditch easements for the purpose of reasonable maintenance.
However, the Court noted that what was at issue in this case, as compared to a
private easement, was a county road right-of-way established by prescriptive use,
and that when a county road is established the public acquires the right-of-way
"and the incidents necessary to enjoying and maintaining it." Montana case law
further prescribes that when a public road, as opposed to a private easement, is
established by prescriptive use, the public right-of-way includes areas necessary
to maintain it and allow for safe and convenient use. Accordingly, since land
for maintenance and repair was already included in the public right-of-way, the
Court held that the trial court erred by granting the County a secondary easement for that specific purpose. The Court reasoned that by doing so the trial
court essentially split and narrowed the public right-of-way, which already existed beyond the portion of the road actually traveled.
After holding that the public could use the Seyler Lane right-of-way beyond
the traveled path, the Court remanded the issue back to the lower court to determine the exact width of the public's easement. However, the Court first had
to determine whether the trial court could consider evidence of past recreational use of the Ruby River when making that determination. PLAA argued
that in the original proceeding the trial court erred by excluding evidence of
historical recreational use. The Court held that while recreational use alone is
not sufficient to establish prescriptive use, it may be considered as part of "the
nature of the enjoyment by which the public road right-of-way was acquired and,
thus, may be considered in determining the width of the public road right-of-
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way." However, the Court stated that recreational uses that extended beyond
the width necessary for maintenance and repair would have to be established
by clear and convincing evidence through the statutory period. The Court also
noted that a party seeking to admit evidence of recreational use could only rely
on use that pre-dated Montana's 1985 statute, which prohibits establishiment of
a prescriptive easement if acquired by entering private property to reach surface
waters.
The Court then turned to the issue of scope and held that public use of the
Seyler Lane right-of-way may include purposes outside those established during
the adverse period. The trial court had determined that the public could not
travel from the road to the water because the areas were designated only for
maintenance and repairs by the County, and, in the alternative, the PLAA had
failed to submit evidence of recreational use occurring during the ori nalprescriptive period. Having already determined that the public's right-of-way included those areas needed for maintenance and repair, the Court held that the
use of a public road right-of-way established by prescriptive use was not limited
to "the adverse usage through which the road was acquired." The Court held
that, as compared to private prescriptive use, the scope of a public road rightof-way is broader and is not limited to the adverse uses by which the public
acquired it. It also includes uses that are reasonably incident to the historical
uses, and uses that are reasonably foreseeable. In other words, PLAA was not
required to show particular recreational use of the right-of-way in order for the
public to use it for that purpose now; it needed only to show that recreational
use was incidental or reasonably foreseeable. The Court concluded that use of
the Seyler Lane right-of-way to access the Ruby River was a "reasonably foreseeable use of a public road right-of-way that crosses a fiver."
Finally, the Court addressed Kennedy's cross-appeal of the trial court's finding that the public could use the Lewis Lane and Lewis Bridge right-of-way,
acquired through an express grant contained in the original deed, to access the
Ruby River. The public acquired use of the Lewis Lane roadway and bridge
after the County purchased the right-of-way from Kennedy's predecessor-in-interest in 1910. Although the 1910 deed contained a grant of the right-of-way,
Kennedy argued that the trial court erred in allowing the public to use the sixtyfoot wide right-of-way to access the river for two reasons: (i) his predecessor
never intended the right-of-way to be used for recreational purposes, such as
fishing and wading; and (ii) granting public access to the Ruby River anmounted
to an unconstitutional taking of property because Kenfiedy owned the riverbed
beneath the right-of-way.
The Court rejected Kennedy's first argument because the Lewis Lane deed
expressly granted a public easement without linitation as to its uses. Without
clear intent otherwise, the court presumes that a dedicator intended the public
to use the right-of-way "in such a way that is most convenient and comfortable
for usage known at the time of dedication and to those justified by lapse of time
and change of conditions." Accordingly, the Court held that public access to
the river was a convenient and comfortable public use justified by the lapse in
time and change in the public's use over that time.
The Court also rejected Kennedy's second argument. Kennedy claimed
that, as the owner of the riverbed underlying a non-navigable stream, he had the
right to exclude the public from accessing that section of the river. The Court,
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however, noted that it "is settled law in Montana" that the owner of a riverbed
does not have the right to exclude the public from utilizing the riverbed of nonnavigable waters and banks up to the high water mark. Therefore, the Court
held that since Kennedy never had the right to control access to the water he
had "no compensable interest" in the property he claims was taken.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's finding that allowing public
access to the Ruby River did not constitute an unconstitutional taking. The
Court, however, reversed the trial court on all other issues and remanded the
case to the trial court to determine the definite singular width of the Seyler Lane
public right-of-way.
Kobi Webb
Skelton Ranch, Inc. v. Pondera Cnty. Canal &Reservoir Co., 328 P.3d 644
(Mont. 2014) (holding that the water court (i) properly admitted historical documents prepared in anticipation of litigation, pursuant to the ancient documents
exception to the hearsay rule; (ii) correctly rejected the Water Master's findings
as to the capacity of a flume on the Thomas ditch and did not improperly substitute its own view of the evidence; (iii) correctly determined that the claimants'
predecessors abandoned or never perfected portions of the claimants' water
rights; and (iv) correctly concluded that the claimants did not acquire any water
rights by adverse possession).
Claimants Gregory Duncan, Sherri Donovan, Terry Dougherty (collectively "Duncan") and Skelton Angus Ranch, Inc. ("Skelton") filed statements of
claim for existing water rights based on notices of appropriation ("NOAs") filed
between 1895 and 1913. These claims shared a single point of diversion from
the South Fork of Dupuyer Creek in the Two Medicine River Basin, from
which the water flowed through the Thomas ditch and into both Duncan and
Skelton's land. Pondera County Canal and Reservoir Company ("Pondera")
filed a notice of intent to appear in the adjudication of Skelton and Duncan's
claims; Pondera also diverted water from the South Fork of Dupuyer Creek
through the Thomas ditch. Following a hearing, the Water Master ("Master")
quantified and assigned priority dates to the claimed water rights. The Montana
Water Court ("water court") amended and then adopted the Master's Report
("Report") as amended. Duncan and Skelton then appealed the decision of the
water court to the Supreme Court of Montana ("Court").
The Court considered four issues on appeal. First, the Court addressed
whether the water court properly admitted documents that Pondera produced
in the early 1900s documenting the water rights in the area. Pondera originally
prepared these documents in order to determine the viability of obtaining land
under the federal Carey Land Act. Duncan and Skelton argued that the documents were self-serving hearsay evidence prepared in anticipation of litigation
and that Pondera had a motive for misrepresentation when the documents were
created. The Court held that the statements were properly admitted under the
ancient documents exception to the hearsay rule. The Court defined an ancient
document as "a document in existence for twenty years or more, the authenticity
of which is established." In this case, Duncan and Skelton conceded that the
documents were in existence for over twenty years and were authentic. Addi-

